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Since this survey' is a continuation of previous articles,2 the same
policies of selection will be used, and developments in the various areas
will be presented as an integrated continuum.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE No. 1
The Supreme Court of the United States in Gideon v. Wainwright$
held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment, which
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. This survey includes cases reported in 155 So.2d through 177 So.2d 328 and laws
enacted by the 1965 General Session of the Florida Legislature.
2. Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 14 U. MIAMNI L. REv. 521 (1960); Wills, Criminal Law
Survey, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 225 (1961); Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV.
381 (1963).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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is fundamental and essential to a fair trial, is made obligatory upon the
States by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 The
Supreme Court of Florida expected a large number of petitions for writs
of habeas corpus and coram nobis from prisoners who had been tried
without the aid of counsel. To expedite consideration of these cases the
Supreme Court of Florida adopted Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1.1
The Court pointed out that Rule No. 1 is similar to Title 28, section
2255 of the United States Code [hereinafter section 2255]6 and suggested
sources of information concerning its construction and application.7
A. Petitions Properly Brought under Rule No. 1
1. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
a. Critical Stages
The general policy which has emerged from the cases surveyed is
that an indigent has an absolute right to appointed counsel at all critical
4. For background and cases prior to period surveyed see Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 18
U. Ms u L. R.Ev. 381 (1963).
5. 151 So.2d 634 (1963). FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of
Florida claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the
State of Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that a
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto.
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that
the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights
of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence
him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the pro-
duction of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained
if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
This rule shall not apply to municipal courts.
6. Enacted 1951.
7. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424
(1962) ; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) ; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205 (1951) ; Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1950) ; FED. R. CPIM. P. 35; 5 BARRON
& HoLTzoF", FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2306; Bowman, Processing a Motion At-
tacking Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 788 (1963).
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stages of prosecution. Whether failure to appoint counsel at non-critical
stages is a denial of due process depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case. Obviously the characterization of the various steps in
criminal prosecution as "critical" or "non-critical" has been an important
and sometimes troublesome problem.
Investigation and interrogation by police prior to a formal charge or
arraignment have been held to be non-critical.8 Furthermore, prisoners
have had difficulty convincing the courts that the particular treatment
they received deprived them of due process. Appellate courts twice found
no deprivation where the prisoner had been held incommunicado for
several days before seeing a magistrate.' Prisoners have attempted to
incorporate the view expressed in Escobedo v. Illinois"° to buttress their
allegations of deprivation. The Escobedo case held that
where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the
police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute consti-
tutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment," Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at
342, and that no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial."
In several cases the prisoner, interrogated without benefit of counsel,
had confessed and subsequently pleaded guilty. The prisoner then argued
that since he had had no attorney at interrogation, the confession was ob-
tained in a manner violative of his constitutional rights. Since he would
not have pleaded guilty if he had not confessed, he argued that he was
deprived of due process and a fair trial. The courts have rejected this
line of reasoning in several ways. One held that the prisoner had not been
denied due pr6cess when the plea was changed to not guilty and the con-
fession was not admitted into evidence.' In another instance the court
distinguished the case from Escobedo by pointing out that the prisoner
failed to make any of the following essential allegations: That he had
requested counsel at the interrogation, that he had been refused counsel,
that he had not been advised of his right to remain silent, and that his
8. Ingrim v. State, 166 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
9. Gillyard v. State, 175 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (Judge Pearson dissented.);
Wooten v. State, 163 So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
10. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
11. Id. at 491.
12. Taylor v. State, 169 So.2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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confession had been considered by the trial court.'3 Relief was denied
twice on the basis that Escobedo is not retroactive. Judge Pearson dis-
sented.
One variation of the above argument came a little closer to judicial
approval. The prisoner alleged that he had been interrogated without
benefit of counsel, that his confession had been coerced, and that he would
not have pleaded guilty had he not confessed. The appellate court indicated
that these allegations stated grounds for relief and since the record did
not resolve the issue of coercion, a hearing should be conducted. On
rehearing, the court found the petition to be inadequate, for lack of an
allegation that the plea of guilty "was induced solely" by the confession."
Furthermore, the court found that material evidence other than the con-
fession was presented by the state or was available.
Long before Gideon, courts held that the preliminary hearing was not
a necessary or essential step in criminal proceedings."6 Therefore, after
Gideon, the courts have had no difficulty in characterizing the preliminary
hearing as non-critical. 7 Of course, failure to offer counsel to an indigent
at the preliminary hearing may, under special circumstances, amount to a
denial of due process.' 8
One such instance occurred where the prisoner confessed during the
investigation. At the preliminary hearing, held without defense counsel,
the magistrate examined and initialed the confession. Subsequently the
magistrate testified before the trial jury that the prisoner had admitted
that the confession was true. A new trial was ordered because the testi-
mony of the magistrate "might well have been persuasive if not conclusive
in the jury's acceptance of the credibility of the confession." 9
The arraignment has been held to be non-critical." Since so many
defenses may be waived at arraignment, prisoners have argued that a
13. Turvey v. State, 174 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). To the same effect, Montgomery
v. State, 176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965) heard by appeal rather than Rule No. 1.
14. Thompson v. State, 176 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Bell v. State, 175 So.2d 80
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
15. Thompson v. State, 176 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
16. DiBona v. State, 121 So.2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
17. Carey v. State, 176 So.2d 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Clark v. State, 174 So.2d 773
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Gibson v. State, 173 So.2d 766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Murray v. State,
172 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Shannon v. State, 172 So.2d 479 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ;
Mathis v. State, 168 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Jackson v. State, 167 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964); Howard v. State, 164 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Wooten v. State, 163
So.2d 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Blake v. State, 163 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Webster v.
State, 156 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
18. Courts have not assumed prejudice from a silent record. Fauls v. State, 164 So.2d 35
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). ,
19. Harris v. State, 162 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1964) (The supreme court heard the case on
direct appeal, rather than Rule No. 1, but the principle is nonetheless applicable.).
20. A plea of not guilty makes the denial of due process by special circumstances more
difficult to prove. Williams v. State, 174 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Ingrim v. State, 166
So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
19651
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plea of guilty made without benefit of counsel is a "special circumstance"
which amounts to a deprivation of due process. One court thought these
circumstances did not cause deprivation because the prisoner was repre-
sented at the trial and counsel could then have moved to change the plea.2'
Judge Carroll, in a dissenting opinion, expressed the view that deprivation
of due process could nonetheless result because after a plea of guilty the
adjudication of guilt is usually perfunctory. He pointed out that the
change of plea is not a matter of right but judicial discretion.
The same problem22 certified as one of great public interest reached
the Supreme Court of Florida.2" The Court rejected the view that the
arraignment is a critical stage,24 rejected the view that it is merely a
formal preliminary step,25 and accepted the view that deprivation of due
process may result from special circumstances-such as a plea of guilty
without benefit of counsel. The court stated "unless the right to counsel
is intelligently waived at the arraignment or by subsequent action of the
accused, a conviction grounded on a guilty plea without the aid of counsel
would be constitutionally defective. 26
The application of the above principle to the facts is worthy of note.
The Court had reasoned that since counsel at the trial did not move to
change the plea, tender any defense, or make any effort to proceed to a
trial on the merits, that the prisoner had reaffirmed his plea of guilty, with
the aid of counsel, and thereby had waived any objection he might have
had to "the lack of counsel at his arraignment."27 The Court answered the
prisoner's argument, that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is subject
to judicial discretion, by suggesting that unless the prisoner had waived
counsel the plea should be granted "as a matter of law."
The trial itself, 8 direct appeal 20 therefrom, and sentencing have been
held to be critical stages. Controversy in these three stages has been mini-
mal. Gideon has been held to be retroactive.30 Trial judges have been
faithfully appointing counsel for indigent appellants on direct appeal.3 '
Where the prisoners were represented at trials, but not at sentencing, the
cases have been remanded for the single purpose of proper sentencing. 2
21. Smith v. State, 168 So.2d 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
22. Sardinia v. State, 162 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
23. Sardinia v. State, 168 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
24. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US. 52 (1961).
25. Ex parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207, 146 So. 827 (1933).
26. Sardinia v. State, 168 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
27. A retroactive waiver.
28. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
30. Geather v. State, 165 So.2d 229, 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing United States v.
LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964) and United States v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir.
1964).
31. Donald v. State, 154 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
32. Evans v. State, 163 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932). Reader v. State, 168 So.2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Phillips v. State, 165 So.2d
[VOL. XX
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Parole and probation hearings have not been considered critical.8
Rule No. 1 hearings, and appeals therefrom, have been held to be
non-criminal in nature and therefore not a critical stage. The develop-
ment of this view has been particularly interesting. Rule No. 1 specifically
provides that the hearing may be conducted without the prisoner. The
production of the prisoner and/or assisting counsel is a matter of judicial
discretion. The federal authority on this point indicates that the prisoner
should be present if facts within his personal knowledge are in issue." If
any testimony is given and the prisoner is not represented by counsel, he
should be present so that he may confront the witnesses, question his own
witnesses and cross-examine the state's witnesses.8" The appellate courts
have followed these federal policies and in addition frequently have indi-
cated or ordered that the prisoner should be present and represented by
counsel. 8 In a few instances appellate courts have indicated considerable
dissatisfaction where the trial courts had not afforded a bona fide hearing
to the prisoner. In one case where neither the prisoner nor a defense
attorney were present at the hearing, the court stated:
We are gravely concerned by the circumstances disclosed by the
record-on-appeal in this case. The record shows that the court
below began dictating its order of denial before it had heard any
of the testimony-a procedure which is unknown in our juris-
prudence and improper to say the least. It is the solemn duty of
every person exercising the judicial powers of the State of
Florida to restrain his personal feelings ... and to interpret and
apply the law in a fair and impartial manner. By its adoption of
Criminal Procedure No. 1 our Supreme Court in effect issued a
directive which we must and shall enforce.... It must always be
borne in mind that Rule No. 1 procedure must be adequate and
effective, for, if it is not, the remedy of habeas corpus may be
employed; and it is the duty of the court to make the remedy
adequate and effective.., evidence should not have been heard
without the presence of the prisoner. The record-on-appeal dis-
closes a hearing in form but not in fact-which is no hearing at
all.87
The right of a prisoner to the aid of counsel on appeal from adverse
orders from a Rule No. 1 hearing was raised in Weeks v. State. 8 The
246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Williams v. State, 165 So.2d 197 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Perkins v.
State, 165 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Abbott v. State, 164 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1964).
33. Phillips v. State, 165 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Thomas v. State, 163 So.2d
328 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
34. United States v. Nickerson, 211 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1954).
35. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1950).
36. Turner v. State, 161 So.2d 11 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Hall v. State, 160 So.2d 527 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964) ; Keur v. State, 160 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Caminita v. State, 159
So.2d 921 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Mullens v. State, 157 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
37. Dickens v. State, 165 So.2d 811, 814 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
38. 156 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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court felt that since a defendant was entitled to assistance of counsel on
direct review39 he was entitled to counsel on collateral proceedings attack-
ing his conviction on constitutional grounds. On certiorari the Supreme
Court of Florida40 noted that all three of the Florida district courts had
held that an indigent is entitled, as a matter of right, to the assistance of
counsel on appeal from an adverse order at a Rule No. 1 hearing.4' The
court observed that federal decisions have held that such proceedings
under section 2255 are not criminal proceedings 42 and thus are not under
the sixth amendment.4 3 The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that
proceedings under Rule No. 1 are civil in nature, analogous to post-con-
viction habeas corpus, and therefore the applicable constitutional require-
ments are the civil due process provisions under section 12, Declaration
of Rights of the Florida Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution, rather than the criminal provisions of
section 11 of the Florida Declaration of Rights and the sixth amendment
right to counsel provisions, as incorporated by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
If the claims of the prisoner are determined to be without substance,
or if the record conclusively shows no grounds for relief, the motion may
be denied without hearing. Otherwise a hearing should be conducted and
the prisoner produced at the discretion of the trial judge. There is no
absolute organic right to counsel at a Rule No. 1 hearing or appeal there-
from. Each case should be decided in light of the fifth amendment due
process requirements-whether counsel is essential to accomplish a fair
and thorough presentation of the prisoner's claims. The court then issued
a "Clarification of Opinion" which stated that since motions under Rule
No. 1 are
.. . cognizable by criminal courts of record as well as circuit
courts, we should point out that such motions are actually
hybrid in character .... However it does not constitute a step
in a criminal prosecution. Therefore, such a motion is not a
component of the prosecution process subject to the guarantees
of Section 11, Florida Declaration of Rights, F.S.A., or the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.44
The court seemed anxious to have its attitude directly expressed for the
record. Justice Thornal found occasion to add:
39. See note 29 supra.
40. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
41. Keur v. State, 160 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Mullins v. State, 157 So.2d 701
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1963) ; King v. State, 157 So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) ; Dias v. State, 155
So.2d 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
42. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1964).
43. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) ; Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959);
United States v. Williamson, 255 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. United States, 214 F.2d
594 (7th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1953).
44. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 898 (Fla. 1964). The sixth amendment provides, "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."
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Admittedly, there are those who seem to advocate a form of
socialization of the legal profession that would provide govern-
ment supplied legal services "from the cradle to the jail." Fortu-
nately, up to this point, such a process of "judicare" has not
attracted general judicial endorsement. Until mandated other-
wise, we have no intention of relegating existing precedents to
the limbo of a jurisprudential graveyard.4"
b. Waiver
The right to counsel may be waived by direct expression or by im-
plication. Rule No. 1 provides that unless the motion and the files and
records conclusively show that a prisoner is not entitled to relief, a hear-
ing should be conducted. The corollary, of course, is that no hearing
is necessary if the motion is insufficient,4" or if the files and records do
not support the motion. The surveyed cases illustrate the rather uniform
policy of the appellate courts to afford hearings wherever merited despite
technical defects in the motion. Where the trial court denied the petition
because the motion referred to the date of sentence rather than the date
of trial, the appellate court remanded and suggested a "liberal interpreta-
tion and application" of Rule No. 1.1" An appellate court held that a docu-
ment labeled "Petition for Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus"
should have been treated as a motion under Rule No. 1.48 Another appel-
late court held that a hearing should not be denied merely because the
motion was unverified, and added that the motions filed by a prisoner pro
se "should not be scrutinized for technical niceties."4 Where the basis of
the motion is denial of counsel, the essential allegations for a sufficient
motion are that the prisoner (1) had no counsel, (2) was indigent and
could not obtain counsel, and (3) did not waive counsel. Where one of
these essential allegations has been merely implied rather than directly
expressed, appellate courts have usually ordered hearings. For example,
where the motion failed to allege no waiver, the court held that the pris-
oner's "mixed factual and conclusional allegations designed to refute the
state's suggestion of waiver" were sufficient.5" Where the motion did not
contain a "concise" allegation of indigency, a statement that the prisoner
could not afford an attorney was sufficient. 1 An insufficient motion may
be denied without a hearing or without reference to the files and records.
At times the trial courts have chosen to examine the files and records. In
such cases some appellate courts conducted their own examination and on
occasion reversed. In one instance the trial court could have denied the
45. Id. at 897.
46. Beeson v. State, 159 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Timble v. State, 159 So.2d 265
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Savage v. State, 156 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
47. Pitts v. State, 158 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), citing Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1 (1963) and Webster v. State, 156 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
48. Andrews v. State, 160 So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
49. Ashley v. State, 158 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
50. Sampson v. State, 158 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
51. Hall v. State, 160 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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motion without a hearing because the prisoner's motion had not denied
waiver of counsel. However, the trial court examined the record and then
denied the motion. The appellate court stated that the motion would have
been sufficient had it alleged that the prisoner had not been advised of his
rights to counsel and had not been offered counsel. The appellate court
then examined the record, found it to be silent on these points and there-
fore reversed and remanded.5 2
Even though the motion is sufficient, a hearing may be denied if the
files and records conclusively show that the allegations are not supported.
The determination of this issue must be made by reference to the files
and records; the state's unverified denial of the allegations has been held
to be insufficient.53 Where the record was insufficient to prove the truth or
falsity of the allegations, hearings were ordered." The trial court was re-
versed where either the evidence outside the files and records was used
to deny a hearing, or where the evidence did not support the trial court's
finding.55 Assuming that the motion contains all three essential allegations,
and that the record supports the first and second, but is not conclusive as
to an express waiver, the question will turn upon whether or not the pris-
oner's conduct proves that he competently and intelligently waived coun-
sel.5" The policy concerning implied waiver was ably described in King v.
State,57 and has been followed in many cases.' If the record is silent or,
shows that the court neither advised [the] defendant of his
constitutional rights to counsel nor offered to appoint counsel,
52. Dixon v. State, 163 So.2d 77.1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). To the same effect: Adkins v.
State, 165 So.2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Hicks v. State, 165 So.2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964);
Johnson v. State, 165 So.2d 187 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
53. Kelley v. State, 175 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Richardson v. State, 168 So.2d
765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
54. Ratcliff v. State, 168 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Quillian v. State, 163 So.2d 1
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Murray v. State, 162 So.2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Ashley v. State,
158 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
55. Mills v. State, 162 So.2d 521 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing Caminita v. State, 159 So.2d
921 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), also Bennett v. State, 165 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) and Keur
v. State, 160 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). In Horton v. State, 170 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1964), the appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the prisoner had been repre-
sented by counsel, and held the trial court's finding that the prisoner was not indigent to be
unacceptable because evidence outside the record was used.
56. Waiver will not be presumed from a silent record. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962).
57. 157 So.2d 440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
58. Coleman v. State, 164 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Alford v. Wainwright, 156
So.2d 1 (Fla. 1963); Perez v. State, 167 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Murphy v. State,
166 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Holmes v. State, 165 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964);
Dortch v. State, 165 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Wilson v. State, 164 So.2d 43 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1964) ; Martin v. State, 164 So.2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Stewart v. State, 163 So.2d
527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Boone v. State, 163 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Tynes v. State,
163 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Sams v. State, 163 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Branch
v. State, 162 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Furman v. State, 162 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964) ; Beadles v. State, 162 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Pitts v. State, 158 So.2d 763 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1963) ; Ashley v. State, 158 So.2d 530 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) ; Crosby v. State, 157
So.2d 867 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
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and the return of the prosecuting attorney of the court makes no
allegations of fact to the effect that the defendant was aware of
his constitutional right to counsel and was offered counsel,59 the
prisoner's motion should be granted.
Under such circumstances a failure to request counsel does not constitute
an intelligent waiver of a known right. However, if the record indicates
that the trial court offered to appoint counsel, then the prisoner must
present evidence tending to prove that he did not competently and intel-
ligently waive. If the facts are in dispute a hearing should be conducted.
In the King case," ° the fact that the prisoner pleaded guilty after being in-
formed of his right to trial, did not justify the denial of a hearing under
Rule No. 1.
Several cases offered particularly interesting applications of the
above policy. A minor prisoner accompanied by his mother pleaded guilty.
The trial judge asked if counsel was desired and both answered in the
negative. The prisoner in his motion alleged that the trial judge failed to
advise that the prisoner was entitled to a court appointed counsel, and he
had previously indicated that he did not want an attorney because he
could not afford one. The trial court denied the motion stating that the
presence of the prisoner was not warranted. The appellate court reversed
and ordered a hearing including a full opportunity for the prisoner or a
court appointed attorney to present evidence."' The courts have afforded
minors excellent protection.
2
Where the trial court asked the prisoner if he desired to consult an
attorney before pleading, an appellate court held that a negative reply was
not conclusive evidence of waiver.
6 3
In another case, the prisoner asked for representation other than the
Public Defender. The Public Defender told the court that he did not want
to represent the prisoner and that the prisoner had sufficient reason to
have him disqualified, and asked the court to appoint another attorney.
The court refused and told the prisoner that if he did not accept the Pub-
lic Defender he would be tried without counsel. The prisoner represented
himself and was convicted. The appellate court held that the conduct of
the prisoner did not constitute a waiver.
64
59. King v. State, 157 So.2d 440, 444 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
60. See note 57 supra.
61. Mullens v. State, 157 So.2d 701 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
62. See note 105 infra.
63. Flemming v. State, 165 So.2d 261 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
64. Donald v. State, 166 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). A case, interesting because of
similar facts, involved the waiver of right to counsel at direct appeal, and was reviewed by
direct appeal rather than under Rule No. 1. The court held that where the defendant rejected
the services of the public defender and represented himself he waived the right to counsel
on direct appeal even though he had requested appointment of counsel other than the public
defender. Brooks v. State, 172 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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In still another case, the prisoner appeared for trial with an attorney,
but due to a disagreement the attorney did not represent him. The trial
judge offered to appoint an attorney if the prisoner would sign an affidavit
of insolvency. He refused. The attorney left to confer with the prisoner's
employer who was trying to obtain another attorney for him. The trial
court felt the case should proceed and tried the prisoner without an at-
torney. The appellate court held that the prisoner had not waived his right
to counsel.65
Where the prisoner was advised of right to counsel on the capital
charge of murder in the first degree, and the State Attorney agreed that
he be allowed to plead guilty to a charge of murder in the second degree,
the appellate court held that he had not intelligently waived right to coun-
sel where he had not been advised of his right to counsel on the second
charge."6
With one exception,67 the First District Court of Appeals has held
that where a trial judge asked the prisoner if he desired counsel, the pris-
oner waived his right to counsel if he answered in the negative and pleaded
guilty." On the other hand, the Second and Third District Courts have
held no waiver resulted unless, in addition, the trial judge had informed
the prisoner of the availability of a state-supplied attorney if he were
indigent.69 This conflict ° was brought to the Supreme Court of Florida,
certified as a question of great public interest.71 The court approved the
latter view and held that the prisoner was entitled to an adversary hearing
on the motion.
c. Incompetent Counsel
The right to counsel implies the right to adequate representation. 72
Occasionally, but rarely successfully, prisoners have alleged that they
were deprived of adequate representation because their counsel was in-
competent.73 The lack of success is not surprising in light of the test that
65. Smith v. State, 167 So.2d 609 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
66. Carver v. State, 171 So.2d 898 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
67. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
68. Hale v. State, 162 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Dykes v. State, 162 So.2d 675 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1964) ; Mankus v. State, 161 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) ; Spriggs v. State, 158
So.2d 786 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
69. Simons v. State, 175 So.2d 215 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Carver v. State, 171 So.2d 898
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Holmes v. State, 165 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Phillips v. State,
164 So.2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Stewart v. State, 163 So.2d 527 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964);
Sams v. State, 163 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Furman v. State, 162 So.2d 308 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964); Beadles v. State, 162 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); King v. State, 157 So.2d
440 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
70. Mason v. State, 167 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
71. Mason v. State, 176 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1965).
72. However an indigent does not have the right to choose a particular attorney.
Simpson v. State, 164 So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Won v. State, 156 So.2d 909 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1963) ; Wilder v. State, 156 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
73. If the defendant retained his own counsel he may not raise the issue of compe-
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is usually employed: Collateral attack is possible only where the sub-
standard level of the attorney's efforts reduced the trial to a mockery or
a farce. Common mistakes of judgment, strategy, trial tactics or policy
are not sufficient.74 On the basis of this policy the following allegations
have been held to be insufficient: that the attorney did not spend any time
with the prisoner, misadvised the prisoner relative to a "deal" with the
state, and made no attempt to obtain vital evidence;75 that the attorney
was not interested; 7 that the attorney advised the prisoner to plead
guilty.17 On the other hand, the following allegations were sufficient to
warrant a hearing: that the attorney did not confer with the prisoner
before trial, did not speak on the prisoner's behalf at the trial, did not
produce two witnesses as promised, forced the prisoner to take the stand,
knew nothing of the facts and admitted this to the judge; 78 that the pris-
oner's right to a new trial or appeal was prejudiced because the attorney
refused to discuss the matter with him after the trial.79
d. Misdemeanors
The Gideon decision" did not specifically limit its application to
felonies, nor did it specifically include misdemeanors or lesser offenses.
Rather, the court specifically avoided the issue:
The special circumstance rule has been formally abandoned
in capital cases and the time has come when it should be simi-
larly abandoned in noncapital cases, at least to offenses which, as
the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial
prison sentence. (Whether the rule should be extended to all
criminal cases need not now be decided.) 81
However, the language of the decision does include suggestive phrases
such as ".... any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."8 2
"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fun-
damental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."88
The sixth amendment upon which the Gideon decision is based refers to
"all criminal prosecutions .... I84
tency, but the competency of a court appointed counsel may be raised under Rule No. 1.
Sears v. United States, 265 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Everett v. State, 161 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1964).
74. Florida courts have employed tests for competency stated in federal cases. Frand
v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962).
75. Simpson v. State, 164 So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
76. Wilder v. State, 156 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
77. Carroll v. State, 172 So.2d 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Thomas v. State, 172 So.2d 245
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
78. Gillyard v. State, 175 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
79. Henderson v. State, 174 So.2d 73 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
80. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
81. Id. at 350.
82. Id. at 344.
83. Id. at 344. (Emphasis added.)
84. Id. at 348.
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The Supreme Court of Florida held that the absolute right to coun-
sel does not apply where the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor.
The court argued as follows:
Following the decision in the Gideon case this court initiated
steps to facilitate the procedure by which convicted felons could
obtain relief ... by adopting Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1.
Thereafter the Legislature of Florida enacted Public Defender
Law, Ch. 63-409 Laws of 1963, creating the office of public de-
fender . . . to represent indigent defendants who are charged
with a non-capital felony .... These actions were taken by this
court and the Legislature as the direct result of-it might be
said, under the coercion of-the mandate of the United States
Supreme Court in the Gideon case .... By limiting the scope of
the Act to felonies, the Legislature has in effect declared the
public policy of this state to be that persons accused of mis-
demeanors only do not necessarily require the appointment of
counsel to assist in their defense.8"
2. SENTENCE
The right of an indigent to counsel at the time of sentencing is not
in serious contention. 6 The interesting problems in this area concern the
limitations upon the prisoner's right to collaterally attack the sentence by
Rule No. 1. The language of the Rule states that the prisoner must be in
custody by virtue of the sentence under attack." This principle has been
applied in several cases.8 1 In a case where the issue merited review, the
court suggested means other than Rule No. 1. The prisoner had been sen-
tenced to life imprisonment as a fourth offender. The court held that he
could not use Rule No. 1 to collaterally attack the prior three convictions,
even though they formed the basis of the life sentence, because he was
not in custody under these sentences. The court suggested that the pris-
oner pursue his argument by means of coram nobis.89
The early cases applied this limitation to consecutive sentences.
Thus, if the first of the consecutive sentences had not been completely
served, the prisoner was precluded from attacking the second sentence,
for he was not in custody under that sentence.90 This principle was ex-
tended to consecutive sentences imposed in different counties.9 The later
85. Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. 1964). (Emphasis of the court.)
86. See note 32 supra.
87. See note 5 supra.
88. Nabozny v. State, 163 So.2d 765 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Frappied v. State, 163 So.2d
502 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Bryant v. State, 174 So.2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) (sentence had
been vacated).
89. McCormick v. State, 164 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
90. White v. State, 165 So.2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
91. Barnes v. State, 173 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Cummings v. State, 166 So.2d
775 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
[VOL. XX
CRIMINAL LAW
cases have reversed this position. The court in Falagon v. State92 stated
that the cases which precluded an attack upon the second consecutive sen-
tence were based upon a series of federal cases which held that a prisoner
could collaterally attack under section 2255 only if the relief sought would
release the prisoner from custody. This law is not applicable in Florida
because section 2255 operates as an attack upon an allegedly illegal judg-
ment and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is used to
attack the sentence. The Florida Rule No. 1 is not predicated on the
proposition that relief would release the prisoner from custody. Rather,
the Rule provides for discharge or re-sentence or correction of sentence
or a new trial. In Jones v. State9" the court approved this reasoning and
presented supporting arguments. The court stated that a prisoner in-
carcerated under consecutive sentences could be considered to be in cus-
tody under both, and that the interests of all concerned would be served
by determining the questions at the earliest possible time. 4
The other problem of note concerns collateral attack of the sentence
under Rule No. 1 on the basis of an alleged miscalculation of the term.
Where a prisoner receives a new trial and is re-sentenced, the trial judge
may impose a greater term than the first sentence. However, the total of
the second sentence plus time served on the first sentence, including gain
time awarded, must not exceed the statutory limit. In one case the pris-
oner argued that the judge did not give credit for the time served on the
first sentence. The appellate court found that the combined sentences plus
gain time did not exceed the statutory limit. However, the solution was not
clear cut because the court implied that, in addition to the above criteria,
the trial judge should give consideration to the original sentence, and it
suggested that trial judges state that they have done so. The court stated
that it assumed the trial judge gave such consideration, and remanded the
prisoner to custody, but without prejudice to file a new motion under
Rule No. 1 to determine in fact whether consideration was given. 5
A prisoner was granted relief where the trial judge failed to credit
time served under a prior void sentence."
3. INSANITY
The trial court denied without a hearing the prisoner's motion which
alleged a previous history of mental incompetency, and incompetency at
92. 167 So.2d 62 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
93. 174 So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
94. This principle has been approved in another case from the Second District, Jerry v.
State, 174 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). Since the Bains case from the First District was
decided after the Falagon case from the Second District, the development of the law on this
point should be interesting.
95. See also Little v. Wainwright, 161 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1964); Tilghman v. Culver, 99
So.2d 282 (Fla. 1957); Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1955); Davis v. State, 166
So.2d 189 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
96. Lassiter v. State, 166 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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the time of conviction. The appellate court, apparently under the impres-
sion that the trial court had not considered the issue of incompetency,
remanded the cause for this purpose." Thereafter the trial court deter-
mined from the record that "such inquiry had been made regarding
Knight's claim of insanity at time of trial, with negative result.""8 The
trial court again denied the motion without a hearing and the appellate
court affirmed."
4. PERJURED EVIDENCE
Where the prisoner's allegations concerning the use of perjured evi-
dence are sufficient, he is entitled to a hearing, 100 but the prisoner must
have alleged not only that the state used perjured testimony, but also that
the state knew the testimony was perjured. 1 1 Allegations that the police
officer who testified knew of the perjury are not sufficient. 10
2
5. WITNESS
The denial of the defendant's right to obtain witnesses and have
process issued for witnesses in his behalf'0° has been held to be subject to
review under Rule No. 1.104
6. NOTICE TO MINOR'S PARENTS OR GUARDIANS
In Milligan v. State,'10 5 even though the prisoner had been repre-
sented by counsel at all critical stages, the court held that, since no notice
was given to the parent or guardian,1°' the order denying the motion under
Rule No. 1 was reversed and remanded with instructions that the judg-
ment and sentence be set aside and the prisoner discharged.
7. TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
The First District Court of Appeals has held in two cases that the
prisoner was "entitled" to a transcript of the record of the trial, but only
97. Knight v. State, 164 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). Rodriguez v. State, 176 So.2d
516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) supports Knight in the view that the issue of insanity may be
appropriately raised under Rule No. 1.
98. Knight v. State, 175 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
99. Knight v. State, 175 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
100. Smith v. United States, 259 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1958); Brown v. State, 163 So.2d
335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Austin v. State, 160 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
101. Gillard v. State, 171 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Amard v. State, 171 So.2d
549 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). For a discussion of this extremely demanding criterion in a compara-
tive context see Murray, Convictions Obtained by Perjured Testimony, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 102,
1965; Note, 7 DuxK L.J. 150 (1958).
102. Gammage v. State, 162 So.2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) citing Sears v. United States,
265 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Ingrim v. State, 166 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
103. FLA. STAT. § 932.37 (1966).
104. Stratos v. State, 167 So.2d 771 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Byers v. State, 163 So.2d 57
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). The federal law seems to be that the right to witnesses is not absolute
and thus appeal is based upon an abuse of discretion. United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798
(6th Cir. 1961) ; Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1956).
105. 177 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
106. As required by FLA. STAT. § 932.38 (1965).
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that part relating to his collateral attack. 0 7 The word "entitled" could
be interpreted as implying that an indigent has a right to be furnished the
transcript at the state's expense. Dorsey v. United States108 held that a
federal prisoner has no right to obtain a transcript of the testimony of his
trial at government expense for the purpose of preparing a case under
section 2 2 5 5.
8. MATTERS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED
ON DIRECT APPEAL
Rule No. 1 was designed for collateral attack. Therefore, matters
which could have been considered on direct appeal may not be reviewed
under Rule No. 1. Although this policy has been applied extensively, a
few exceptions have occurred where the alleged infringement could have
resulted in a gross departure from due process and a fair trial, and where
appeal was difficult. An illustration of the first instance occurred in Burse
v. State.1 9 The prisoner and a co-defendant had been convicted of murder.
The co-defendant appealed and a new trial was ordered because the
prosecution had commented on his failure to testify. The prisoner did
not appeal and four years later filed a petition under Rule No. 1. The
court held that the comment amounted to a denial of due process, that a
hearing was not necessary because the record established the comment,
and therefore ordered a new trial. In another case which involved com-
ment by the prosecution, the prisoner alleged that he was indigent and
that the Public Defender had refused his request to appeal. The court
stated that such allegations negated a "waiver" of right to appeal and
that "the trial court may again consider (as on a delayed motion for a new
trial) the ... merits of the ... contentions .... M10
The importance of the "availability" of appeal is illustrated by a pair
of cases in which the defense attorney was appointed just prior to trial
and a continuance was denied. The petitions under Rule No. 1 alleged
that the procedure was tantamount to a denial of the right to effective
representation. In one case the petition was denied because the prisoner
did not raise the issue of indigency until several days after the arraign-
ment and the record showed no infringement upon his right to appeal.",
In the other case the prisoner, acting in proper person, filed a motion for
a new trial. After the motion was denied the prisoner informed the court
that he wanted to appeal and requested counsel for that purpose. This
request and his subsequent petition under Rule No. 1 was denied. The
appellate court determined that he had been denied due process and re-
versed." 2
107. Hall v. State, 165 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Harris v. State, 161 So.2d 885
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
108. 333 F.2d 1015 (6th Cir. 1964).
109. 175 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
110. Jackson v. State, 166 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
111. Lambert v. State, 169 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
112. French v. State, 161 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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B. Petitions Not Properly under Rule No. 1
During the period of survey, many problems other than the right to
counsel were raised under Rule No. 1, and the courts were required to
determine which were appropriate to the Rule. The policy of broadest
application is that Rule No. 1 was designed for collateral attack and
therefore issues which could have been raised on direct appeal may not
be brought under Rule No. 1."' The courts have held that the following
issues could not be raised by Rule No. 1: legality of arrest and admissi-
bility of evidence," 4 sufficiency of evidence," 5 failure to supply prisoner
with a copy of the charges," 6 refusal to supply court reporter at trial,"7
failure to grant continuance," s former jeopardy,"' denial of speedy trial
where prisoner failed to request trial, 2 ° alibi witness not available, and
"confession" of another prisoner to the crime.' 2' In two cases the prisoner
argued that he plead guilty in order to get a light sentence but had re-
ceived a long term. In one instance his motion was held inappropriate
because he could have moved to withdraw his plea, and could have ap-
pealed if his motion was denied. 122 In the other, the promises were made
to the prisoner by his privately employed counsel. The court held his peti-
tion was not properly brought under Rule No. 1 because the state was
not responsible for such inducements." 3
One case caused considerable controversy. The prisoner alleged that
he was denied due process because Negroes were systematically excluded
from the grand jury and petit jury. The court held that where the prisoner
failed to raise timely objection in the trial court, he could not collaterally
attack his conviction by Rule No. 1"' The prisoner cited federal au-
thority to the effect that the issue could be raised collaterally,"' but the
113. Austin v. State, 160 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing Enzor v. United States,
379 U.S. 854 (1961). Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962); Marti v.
State, 163 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
114. Chayter v. State, 176 So.2d 382 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Austin v. State, 160 So.2d
730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
115. Johnson v. State, 177 So.2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Bell v. State, 168 So.2d 336
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) ; Sam v. State, 167 So.2d 258 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Simpson v. State, 164
So.2d 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) ; Austin v. State, 160 So.2d 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
116. Frisby v. State, 167 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
117. Lee v. State, 165 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing Bowen v. United States, 260
F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1958). Smith v. United States, 252 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1958); Harper v.
State, 168 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
118. Lambert v. State, 169 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). See notes 111, 112 supra.
119. Baker v. State, 175 So.2d 573 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
120. Kemp v. State, 177 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
121. Grant v. State, 166 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
122. Conley v. State, 160 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964). Note: Although FLA. STAT.
§ 909.13 (1965) provides for change of plea before sentence, change of plea after sentence
has been permitted. Banks v. State, 136 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
123. Manning v. State, 176 So.2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
124. Lee v. State, 173 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). Considerable federal authority
supports this.
125. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935);
Bailey v. Henslee, 287 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1961).
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court pointed out that, with one exception,2 6 timely objection at the trial
court had been made. The court distinguished the one exception, as
follows:
[N]o motion based upon the exclusion of Negroes from the
grand jury or petit jury in Mobile, Alabama, had ever been
made prior to the Seals trial, nor had the witnesses who testified
ever known of a Negro serving on a Mobile jury in a capital case
in which a Negro was a defendant. . . . An additional factor
... was ... that the evidence to support objections to the com-
position of the jury was entirely unknown to the defendant....
Furthermore, that evidence was not known to the attorney who
defended Seals. 27
C. Successive Motions
Rule No. 1 provides that the court is not required to entertain second
or successive motions for similar relief. On this basis the court denied a
second petition which was substantially the same.'28 In one instance, the
prisoner requested permission to withdraw his petition. The court "upon
consideration of the request" dismissed the motion. The prisoner's subse-
quent motion based upon the same allegations was denied.129 The rule is
not absolute. A prisoner filed a motion alleging a denial of right to counsel.
This motion was denied without a hearing and the prisoner filed a second
motion on the same grounds, but containing allegations which, if true,
were sufficient to warrant relief. This, too, was denied, and the prisoner
appealed. The appellate court cited the federal rule which applies to suc-
cessive petitions under section 2255: [that the petition]
should be denied on the ground of a prior denial only if (1) the
same ground presented in the subsequent motion was determined
adversely to the prisoner on the prior application, (2) the prior
determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent
application. 180
The court held that since the files and records did not conclusively show
that the prisoner was not entitled to relief, and since the prior denial was
not on the merits, the order denying relief was reversed.' 8 '
D. Miscellaneous
1. BAIL
A prisoner is not necessarily entitled to bail pending an appeal of
denial of motion under Rule No. 1.182
126. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962).
127. Id. at 68.
128. Manning v. State, 167 So.2d 616 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
129. Rankin v. State, 168 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
130. Archer v. State, 166 So.2d 163, 164 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
131. Archer v. State, 166 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
132. Simmons v. State, 163 So.2d 888 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), citing Gammage v. State,
154 So.2d 712 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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2. NOTICE OF APPEAL
Since proceedings under Rule No. 1 have been considered non-
criminal, but rather hybrid or civil in nature, 88 the time for filing motion
for appeal from adverse decision under Rule No. 1 has been changed from
90184 to 60 days.13 Carroll v. State' held that separate notices of appeal
are necessary to review separate judgments.
II. SENTENCE
The jurisdiction of trial judges to defer sentence was severely limited
by changes made in the parole and probation statutes in 195 7.87 Jurisdic-
tion is lost when the maximum time for which the sentence could have
been imposed has passed. 188 However, the trial judge maintains jursdiction
to sentence up until the date of maximum time, but he may not sentence
the defendant to a period which would exceed that date.'89 In one instance
where the sentence could have been life imprisonment, the trial judge
sentenced the defendant to a term of five years, then suspended sentence
and placed him on probation. Subsequently, the trial judge revoked pro-
bation and re-sentenced the defendant to a term of five years to run from
that date. The appellate court affirmed,140 even though the term of the
second sentence would have exceeded the expiration date of the original
sentence, because the term did not exceed the date of the maximum time
possible-life.
An unusual application of the above principles occurred in Yates v.
Buchanan.14' The defendant was sentenced to a term but allowed to re-
main at liberty due to poor health. After four years the trial judge ordered
that he serve the sentence. The appellate court held that the order was
invalid because the maximum time for which the sentence could have been
imposed had expired. Judge Barkdull, dissenting in part, distinguished the
case on the basis that the actual sentencing had not been delayed. The
delay had to do with the service of sentence and was occasioned by the
defendant's own request. Judge Barkdull reasoned that even if the trial
judge were in error as the majority argued, the error was induced by the
defendant and he should not be allowed to take advantage of it. The
writer considers the point well taken. From a practical point of view, the
decision of the majority might cause trial judges to be reluctant to defer
incarceration for reasons of health.
133. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
134. .Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
135. Barton v. State, 176 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
136. 171 So.2d 196 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
137. FLA. STAT. § 948.01-49.03 (1965).
138. State v. Bateh, 110 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959) ; Helton v. State, 106 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1958);
Bateh v. State, 101 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1958).
139. Rodriguez v. State, 119 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1960).
140. Drayton v. State, 177 So.2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
141. 170 So.2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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The principle that a defendant is entitled to credit for time served
under a void sentence where he is re-tried and re-sentenced in the same
case 142 was held not to apply where he was re-sentenced in a subsequent
unrelated case.' Credit for time served out of prison, while on parole,
was denied where the prisoner was re-incarcerated due to violation of
parole. 44
III. CONFESSIONS
Before the Escobedo case 4' the Florida law concerning the admissi-
bility of confessions had been quite stable and simple. Voluntary confes-
sions were admissible; involuntary confessions were not. An extra-judicial
confession was not necessarily rendered involuntary by the fact that the
defendant was not advised of his constitutional right to remain silent, or
by the fact that he was not taken without delay to a committing magis-
trate. The federal rule which excludes confessions elicited during pro-
longed pre-commitment detention'46 has not been adopted in Florida.
The Escobedo case may have considerable influence on the law of
Florida in two areas-the right to counsel 47 and admissibility of confes-
sions. In all cases in which the court was asked to follow Escobedo the
judges have managed to distinguish the facts. In Crum v. State48 the
court pointed out that the defendant had been advised of his constitu-
tional rights, and reaffirmed the Florida view that the accused need not
be taken before a committing magistrate before a statement can be taken
from him. In Montgomery v. State' 9 the court distinguished the case on
the basis that the defendant made no request for counsel either before or
at the time of confession nor was it claimed that he was unaware of his
right to remain silent. The attitude of the court was indicated by its ref-
erence to the majority's holding in Escobedo as a "kind of judicial leger-
demain."'5 ° However, some dissatisfaction with prior decisions has been
expressed. For example, in one case, although the court held that the con-
fession was admissible because there was no showing of prejudice by fail-
ing to take the defendant to a magistrate, the court stated:
Were this the first time that the subject statute had been pre-
sented to an appellate court with these circumstances clearly
delineated, we would be constrained to agree with appellant and
hold that the failure of arresting officers to reasonably comply
142. Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1957); Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 136
(Fla. 1955).
143. Jackson v. State, 172 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
144. Richardson v. Wainwright, 171 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1965).
145. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
146. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
147. See notes 12, 13, 14 supra.
148. 173 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
149. 176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965).
150. Id. at 335.
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with the provisions of the statute will render an admission or
confession against interest during such period of incarceration
inadmissible. We think this is the purpose the legislature had in
mind in passing such a statute and that a flouting of same by
law enforcement officers of this state should not be sanctioned
any more than the violation of the criminal laws of this state by
those charged with such offenses. However, in view of the de-
cisions rendered by our Supreme Court in Leach v. State, 132
So.2d 329 (Fla. 1961), Dawson v. State, 139 So.2d 408 (Fla.
1962) and Milton v. Cochran, 147 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1962), we
have no alternative but to hold that failure to comply with the
terms of the subject statute will not, of itself, render an extra-
judicial confession inadmissible.'
State v. Hodges'52 held that although the trial judge erred in allow-
ing the state to introduce the defendant's extra-judicial confession before
other evidence established prima facie proof of the corpus delicti, the
error was cured by subsequent evidence sufficient to independently estab-
lish the corpus delicti. The Supreme Court of Florida, 3 on writ of cer-
tiorari, reversed because the evidence independent of the confession did
not establish prima facie proof of the corpus delicti.
In Lett v. State 54 the court held that where the defendant made state-
ments to an investigating officer and subsequently the defendant reduced
the statements to writing on the officer's promise not to take out a war-
rant against him, the written statement was not voluntary because it was
induced by promise of reward, but the officer's testimony concerning the
original statements was admissible.
Although the influence of narcotics generally relates to credibility,
a confession given under influence of demerol was held to be involun-
tary.155
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Contrary to the trend in some other areas and in other times, the
courts, during the period surveyed, seemed to have given the police more
leeway in matters of search and seizure. The policy in Florida has been
that where the police arrest a person for vagrancy in order to obtain evi-
dence of a second crime, the evidence so obtained would be admissible if
the arrest for vagrancy were not merely a "ruse." Where the defendant
was prosecuted and convicted of vagrancy the courts had no difficulty in
holding that the arrest for vagrancy was not merely a ruse. 6 This policy
151. Gore v. State, 163 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
152. 169 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
153. Hodges v. State, 176 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1965).
154. 174 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
155. Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964).
156. Blake v. State, 112 So.2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
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was extended in Rinehart v. State157 so as to admit evidence of the second
crime even though the defendant was acquitted of vagrancy. Recently the
courts extended the policy even further. The defendants were arrested for
vagrancy, searched and subsequently convicted of possession of burglary
tools. The courts justified the admission of evidence on the basis of the
Rinehart case even though the defendants were well dressed, drove a 1964
Pontiac, and "had more than adequate means." The opinion does not men-
tion any prosecution for vagrancy. 5'
A search must be reasonably related to the offense for which the de-
fendant was arrested. Where traffic violators are to be taken to the police
station as fourth offenders, the police may "pat down" the persons in
search of concealed weapons. Search beyond this point is open to question.
In one case the defendant was ordered to empty his pockets. He did so
and the contents were admissible in evidence in a lottery charge.5 9 In
another case the officers emptied the defendant's pockets, in spite of his
protests, and the contents were admissible in a lottery prosecution.'60
A dissenting judge argued that where the defendant had been arrested for
driving without a license the search was unreasonable because the de-
fendant admitted that he had no license, and the "patting down" was suf-
ficient protection. The writer agrees with the dissent.
Several cases turned on the right of a police officer to enter a dwelling
by force.' 6 ' Forcible entries were held to be unlawful where they were
made prior to announcement of the officer's authority and purpose 6 2 and
prior to affording the defendant reasonable opportunity to allow entry. 68
A peaceful entry made in the presence of others, without announcement
of authority and purpose was lawful.
6 4
Property rights were in question in several cases. Two cases'65 held
that a still, not within the curtilage of the dwelling, was not under immu-
nity from unreasonable search and seizure.166 Maclin v. State167 re-
affirmed the view that the defendant operating an automobile in the
presence of the owner may not contest the validity of the search of the
vehicle. Fletcher v. State'68 held that an attack on the validity of the
search of a dwelling was immaterial as related to jewelry that apparently
157. 114 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
158. Sutherland v. State, 167 So.2d 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
159. Smith v. State, 155 So.2d 826 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
160. Smith v. State, 167 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1964).
161. FLA. STAT. § 901.19 (1965).
162. Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
163. McLendon v. State, 176 So.2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
164. Koptyra v. State, 172 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
165. Phillips v. State, 177 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) and Lane v. State, 177 So.2d
245 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
166. The court distinguished the case from Houston v. State, 113 So.2d 582 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1959) where the still was within the curtilage.
167. 162 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
168. 168 So.2d 162 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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had been thrown out of the window for the jewelry had not been taken by
the officers from the dwelling.
V. CHARGE TO THE JURY
The law concerning an important instruction was changed during the
period under survey. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a conviction
of murder in the first degree rendered without a recommendation of mercy
where the trial judge had charged the jury that the defendant could be
subject to parole if the verdict were guilty of murder in the first degree
with a recommendation of mercy.'69 The court noted that matters of
parole are beyond the jurisdiction of the jury and recommended that in
capital cases the judge should instruct the jury that provision for proba-
tion should not influence their decision as to mercy. The court expressly
overruled a previous contrary holding.17 0 The court considered the matter
important enough to the interests of justice to justify review even though
the appellant had not objected at the trial. 7 '
In addition to the above change, a conflict in an important area was
resolved. The Supreme Court of Florida took jurisdiction on the basis of
a conflict between prior decisions, and held that where the trial judge has
instructed the jury as to manslaughter, he should not refuse to instruct
them as to excusable and justifiable homicide as well since manslaughter
is defended in terms of the latter homicides. 72
According to a Florida statute" the court shall in all cases charge
the jury as to the degrees of the offense. Section 918.10(a) of Florida
Statutes, 1963, provides that no party shall assign as error, or grounds for
appeal, the giving or failing to give an instruction unless he made appro-
priate objection. A series of cases 74 have held that a failure to instruct on
a lesser included offense is not fundamental error where no evidence rela-
tive to the lesser offense was presented and where no request had been
made by the defendant for such an instruction, and where the failure to so
instruct was not set forth in the defendant's motion for a new trial. This
view was followed where a conviction for robbery was affirmed where no
charge on larceny was given,' 75 and a conviction for grand larceny was
affirmed where no instruction on petit larceny was given. 176 Allison v.
169. Burnette v. State, 157 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1963).
170. Phillips v. State, 92 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1957).
171. For discussion of the related problem of instructing the jury as to the penalty see
Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 14 U. MIAmi L. REv. 529 (1960).
172. Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965).
173. FiA. STAT. § 919.14 (1965).
174. Johnson v. State, 130 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1961); Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.
1961) ; Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1960) ; State v. Brown, 118 So.2d 574 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1960).
175. Johnson v. State, 173 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
176. Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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State' followed the usual rule that if a defendant requested charges of
lesser included offenses (assault and assault and battery) failure to so
charge was reversible error even though the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction of assault with intent to commit rape.
VI. APPEAL
Previously courts have held that where a prisoner delivered notice of
appeal to the prison authorities for transmission to the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court, but, due to delay caused by the prison authorities, it was not
filed in time, 78 the notice was nonetheless timely made.' This view was
reversed by State v. Smith80 and Burke v. State'' in which the courts
held that timely notice is an essential jurisdictional requirement and that
no appeal was possible. The courts stated that the decision was without
prejudice to apply for relief by way of habeas corpus. In subsequent
habeas corpus proceedings 8 2 the court discharged the prisoner from cus-
tody because the action of the state's "functionaries" which made appeal
impossible had caused the petitioner to be denied due process and equal
protection of the laws.
A series of old cases had held that when the defendant failed to make
timely motion for a new trial he could not contest the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal. 3 However, none of these cases indicated whether or
not the defendant had moved for a directed verdict. A recent case 8 4 held
that, in non-jury trial, if the defendant made a motion for directed verdict,
the sufficiency of evidence may be considered on appeal even though no
motion for a new trial was made.
VII. EVIDENCE
The trial court admitted into evidence a tape recording of a telephone
conversation between the defendant and a person who had consented to
the recording. The majority of the court affirmed the conviction on the
basis that evidence obtained with the knowledge and consent of at least
one conversant is admissible, even though the person adversely affected
had no knowledge of the interception. A dissenting judge expressed the
view that such a procedure constituted a violation of the defendant's right
to avoid self-incrimination, his right to be secure in his home, and his
177. 162 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
178. FLA. R. APP. P. 6.2.
179. Henry v. State, 158 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963); Perez v. State, 143 So.2d 663
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
180. 160 So.2d 518 (Fla. 1964).
181. 160 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
182. Hooper v. Wainwright, 168 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
183. Gilbert v. State, 148 Fla. 293, 4 So.2d 330 (1941) ; Thornton v. State, 143 Fla. 443,
196 So. 842 (1940).
184. Hogwood v. State, 175 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The dissenting
opinion commented,
After a full analysis of the Federal decisions, I would be less
than candid if I did not concede that the Federal courts have
fluctuated in their decisions from day to day, from fact to fact,
from constitutionality to unconstitutionality and from admissi-
bility to inadmissibility. 185
The defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of marijuana.
Two officers and a private citizen were present but only one officer testi-
fied at non-jury trial. The defendant testified and denied the charge. He
appealed the conviction and the district court of appeal reversed on the
basis of insufficient evidence. The issue was certified as one of great
public interest. The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction and
quashed the decision of the district court with directions that the decision
of the criminal court of record be reinstated.'86 The court stated,
We know of no statute or case law in this jurisdiction which
requires more than one witness to a criminal case nor do we be-
lieve it proper for an appellate court to reverse a conviction of
guilty upon the basis of insufficiency of the State's evidence
merely because the State produced but one witness and his testi-
mony was contradicted by the defendant."'
However the court indicated that the more desirable procedure would have
been for both officers to have testified unless the evidence would have
been merely cumulative. Justice Drew dissented. He considered that the
failure of the other witnesses to corroborate could have created an infer-
ence that their testimony would have been adverse to the state. Such an
inference might so weaken the testimony of the officer that the evidence
would become insufficient. The point is well taken.'88
In Grant v. State,'89 using established principles applicable to still
pictures, the court decided for the first time in Florida that motion pic-
tures are admissible in criminal trials. A dissenting judge thought that the
particular pictures of the defendant re-enacting the event were prejudicial
and perhaps an inaccurate portrayal. His dissent was not related to the
principal of law, but to its application.
The conflict between the right of the defendant to confront his ac-
cusers, and the need of the state to hide the identity of its confidential
185. Barber v. State, 172 So.2d 857, 864 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) citing Griffith v. State,
111 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
186. State v. Sebastan, 171 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1965).
187. Id. at 895.
188. The judgment of the trial court was ultimately re-instated. Sebastin v. State, 172
So.2d 622 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
189. 171 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1965).
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informers, raises questions concerning the defendant's right to know the
identity of the person who produced the evidence upon which a search
warrant was based. A recent case 0° held that the state need not identify
an informer who was not a participant, who would not testify and who
informed an officer, where the officer rather than the informer made the
affidavit.' 9 ' The court further held that the state need not produce a lottery
ticket purchased by the informer where neither the ticket, nor its pur-
chase, were material and where the disclosure might identify the informer.
In Capitoli v. State"2 the court held that although the admission of
evidence obtained by an allegedly unreasonable search and seizure was
error, the decisions should not be reversed where the trial judge stated
that he based his decision exclusively on other evidence. 93 The court
cited only out-of-state cases.'94
VIII. FAIR TRIAL
Two issues related to the defendant's right to a fair trial were raised
for the first time in Florida. In Kaplow v. State,'95 in spite of timely ob-
jection, the trial court permitted the state to call a co-defendant as a
witness. The co-defendant refused to answer questions on grounds of self-
incrimination. The appellate court held as a matter of law that where one
of the co-defendants was required by the state to take the stand and was
asked questions which the state knew the co-defendant would refuse to
answer on the basis of self-incrimination, both defendants had "been
prejudiced in the eyes of the jury to the extent that a fair trial is im-
possible."' 98 Courts in some states consider this procedure to be a matter
of judicial discretion.
In Porter v. State'97 the defendant claimed a denial of a fair trial
because the trial judge's father was a member of the jury. The Supreme
Court affirmed because the appropriate statute'98 did not prohibit this
procedure and because the defendant failed to make timely objection at
the trial.
Where the actual trial procedure afforded the defendant a fair trial,
the court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that
190. City of Miami v. Jones, 165 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
191. This confirms the trend in recent decisions. E.g., Baker v. State, 150 So.2d 729 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1963) ; State v. Hardy, 114 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
192. 175 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
193. In the writer's opinion such practices could easily lead to abuse.
194. Butler v. United States, 138 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1943) ; State v. Davis, 120 Ala. 99,
23 So.2d 801 (1945); State v. Roach, 163 La. 329, 111 So. 775 (1927); State v. Lowery,
110 So. 721 (La. 926); Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Ct. App. R. 518, 107 S.W. 849 (1908).
195. 157 So.2d 862 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
196. Id. at 864.
197. 160 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1963).
198. FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1965).
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he was brought into the court's jurisdiction by "forcible abduction"
rather than proper extradition.19
IX. ENHANCED PUNISHMENT
Recent cases200 indicate that an indictment or information may not
allege that the defendant had been previously convicted of an unrelated
crime in order to enhance the punishment under the general habitual of-
fender statute.2 1 However, where the statute defining the crime,0 2 pro-
vides for enhanced punishment for repeated offenses, the information must
allege prior offenses of that statute in order to enhance the punishment.
This principle was followed in a recent prosecution of a narcotics case
where the information alleged a prior violation of the statute.20 The
appellate court expressed some appreciation of the argument that where
the state has a choice of means to enhance the punishment, the habitual
offender statute should be used, but nevertheless ruled that the motion to
quash should have been denied. 4
X. HABEAS CORPUS
A collateral attack by habeas corpus upon criminal proceedings has
been considered to be civil in nature. Therefore, courts have held that an
indigent was not entitled as a matter of right to a state appointed counsel
to assist him in an appeal from a final judgment denying his application
for a writ of habeas corpus.208 On the same basis, the appeal time has
been held20 0 to be the same as in civil cases. 0 7 The court noted that this
ruling was a recession from previous holdings.20
The effect of Criminal Proceduce Rule No. 1 upon habeas corpus has
been clarified. The Supreme Court of Florida has held in several cases
that a writ of habeas corpus will not be considered if the same grounds
for attack are available under Rule No. 1. Writs were denied when the
petition failed to proceed under Rule No. 1 including appellate review.209
199. Jolly v. Wainwright, 175 So.2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), citing Frisbie v. Collins,
342 U.S. 519 (1952). Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1946); Hunter v. State,
174 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
200. For example, Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1958).
201. FLA. STAT. ch. 775 (1965).
202. Forgery, FLA. STAT. § 831.10 (1965); counterfeiting, FA. STAT. § 831.17 (1965);
beverage laws, FLA. STAT. § 562.45 (1965).
203. FLA. STAT. § 398.22 (1965).
204. State v. Curtis, 152 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). For a rationale of the decision
see Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 18 U. Mramrx L. REV. 395 (1963).
205. Coffee v. Wainwright, 172 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
206. "Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1964).
207. FLA. STAT. § 59.01(3,4) (1965).
208. Snell v. Mayo, 80 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1955) ; Sweat v. Hixom, 45 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1950).
209. Gentry v. State, 172 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1965) ; Brown v. Wainwright, 158 So.2d 527
(Fla. 1963) ; Gafford v. Wainwright, 157 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1963) ; Mitchell v. Wainwright, 155
So.2d 868 (Fla. 1963) ; Evans v. State, 175 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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XI. RECOMMENDATION OF MERCY
After accepting a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, the
trial court empanelled a jury to consider the question of mercy. The jury
did not recommend mercy and the judge sentenced the defendants to
death. The appellate court held that although this procedure was not
authorized, it did not constitute reversible error because "the judge
decided independently, though his conclusion may have been strengthened
." by the decision of the jury.210 The court suggested that if the
judge had wanted a jury to consider mercy he could have rejected the
guilty plea and have caused a plea of not guilty to be entered.
XII. DIRECTED VERDICT
State v. Shiver21 raised a point of first impression in Florida. The
defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court reserved ruling on the
motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty and was discharged. The defendant renewed his motion for a
directed verdict. After several weeks the court granted the defendant's
motion and set aside the verdict of the jury. On appeal the state argued
that the court could not direct a verdict of not guilty after the jury had
been discharged. The appellate court affirmed and noted that in absence
of legislative prohibition, "the court possessed inherent power to direct a
verdict of not guilty pursuant to the reservation of its ruling where it
deemed the same essential for the proper administration of justice ....
Federal, 218 but no Florida, authority was cited.
XIII. METRO COURTS
The Florida Supreme Court in County of Dade v. Saffan,214 held that
section 932.52(2) of the Florida Statutes, which prescribes a 30 day
period within which an appeal may be taken from a municipal court, does
not apply to appeals from Dade Metropolitan Courts. The court reasoned
that metropolitan courts could not be considered to be municipal courts
and hence that the Home Rule Charter provision providing a 20 day
period had to control.
XIV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In accordance with the general trend toward increased protection of
the constitutional rights of individuals, section 43-10.5215 of the City Code
210. Lee v. State, 166 So.2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1964).
211. 174 So.2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
212. Id. at 779.
213. Ex Parte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1939).
214. 173 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1965).
215. Any person in the City shall be disorderly who is found standing, loitering, or
strolling about in any place in the City and not being able to give a satisfactory
account of himself, or who is without any lawful means of support.
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of the City of Miami relating to vagrancy, was held invalid because the
language was too vague,21 and the Supreme Court of Florida217 under
order of the Supreme Court of the United States218 receded from its
former view and held Florida Statute, section 798.05, providing for higher
penalties for the cohabitation of white and colored persons, than provided
for persons of the same race, to be unconstitutional.
XV. LOTTERY
The usual requirements to establish a lottery are a prize, an award
of the prize by chance, and a consideration. A rather important case219
raised the meaning of the term "consideration." The defendant, the
manager of a grocery store, conducted a "Good Will Cash Night" wherein
participants were required to register, obtain a card, have the card
punched weekly, but were not required to pay or buy merchandise. The
court held that a pecuniary consideration was not required. This view
was supported by two civil cases.220 A dissenting judge considered that
gambling implies a tangible risk which in turn requires a pecuniary
consideration.
XVI. MATERIAL WITNESS
The defendant, who had turned state witness, alleged that he was
entitled to discharge pursuant to Florida Statute, section 902.17(4).221
The court222 held that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the
statute because his incarceration was not the result of the independent
action of the state, but rather was the result of his own action in making
an agreement to ally with the state, and because the statute applies only
to witnesses held under order of a magistrate. The court then justified
the incarceration, where the defendant could not make bond, on the basis
that the circuit court has the inherent power to hold material witnesses in
the interest of justice.
XVII. FORMER JEOPARDY
Where the jury was discharged, over the defendant's objection, be-
cause the trial was running past midnight into the ensuing time of court,
and the case was re-scheduled for trial, the defendant's motion to quash
based upon former jeopardy was sustained. 23 The court stated that the
216. Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965).
217. McLaughlin v. State, 172 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1965).
218. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
219. Blackburn v. Ippolito, 156 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
220. Little River Theatre Corp. v. State, 135 Fla. 854, 185 So. 885 (1939) (involving a
nuisance) ; Dorman v. Publix-Saenger-Sparks Theatres, 135 Fla. 284, 180 So. 886 (1938).
221. Provides procedure for release of material witness unable to give security.
222. State v. Buchanan, 175 So.2d 803 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
223. State v. Cooper, 157 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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jury should be discharged only in cases of necessity and that the expira-
tion of the term of court creates no such necessity in Florida.
XVIII. WORTHLESS CHECK
The meaning of the term "thing of value" within the context of the
worthless check statute is a question which has been in contention for
quite some time.224 The defendant issued a check which was dishonored
because the account had been closed. He then issued a second worthless
check drawn on a different bank in exchange for the dishonored check. He
was charged under Florida Statute, section 832.05(3) for issuing the
second worthless check for a "thing of value." He argued that the dis-
honored check was worthless and thus not a "thing of value." The court
held that the first check was evidence of a debt and therefore was a "thing
of value" within the meaning of Florida Statute, section 832.05(3).225
XIX. BREAKING AND ENTERING
The Florida courts have decided that within the meaning of Florida
Statute, section 810.05, a telephone booth located inside a building is not
a building, 226 but an outside telephone booth is a building.2 27
XX. LEGISLATION
Important changes in criminal law and procedure made during the
1965 session of the Florida Legislature were few. Perhaps one of the
most significant additions is provision for privileged communication be-
tween patient and psychiatrist.2" The privilege is limited. It does not
apply when the patient, having been informed that the communication
will not be privileged, has made disclosures in the course of a psychiatric
examination ordered by the court; any such communication would be
admissible, however, only on issues involving the patient's mental condi-
tion. Further, the privilege does not apply in civil or criminal proceedings
where the patient introduces his mental condition as an element in his
claim or defense. However, the privilege does cover the area where it is
needed most-private therapy. This law defines a psychiatrist as a person
licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial part of his time
to the practice of psychiatry.229
224. For discussion of previous cases see Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 16 U. MAM L.
REv. 234 (1961) and Wills, Criminal Law Survey, 18 U. Ma.ae L. REv. 395 (1963).
225. McCormick v. State, 161 So.2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
226. Dewalt v. State, 156 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
227. Perry v. State, 174 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965), citing Sanchez v. People, 142
Colo. 58, 349 P.2d 561 (1960) ; People v. Miller, 95 Cal. App. 2d 696, 213 P.2d 534 (4th Dist.
1950) and People v. Clemison, 105 Cal. App. 2d 679, 233 P.2d 924 (2d Dist. 1951).
228. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-404, creating FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1965).
229. In the writer's opinion, the exclusion of communications between patients and
other recognized and licensed psychotherapists is unnecessary and unfortunate.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Provision was made for the formation of a committee to study juve-
nile delinquency and submit a report to the governor.230 The committee
will be composed of three members of the Florida Senate appointed by the
President of the Senate and three members of the Florida House of
Representatives appointed by the Speaker. Another enactment concerning
juveniles provided for amendment of Florida Statute, section 856.04, so as
to provide penalty for a man who deserts or willfully withholds support
from his wife or children. The provision will apply even though the child is
illegitimate, providing that the fact of fatherhood had been adjudicated
by a court in any state.
23 1
A few new laws relating to special instances of general criminal con-
duct were enacted. Counterfeiting drivers licenses or possession of instru-
ments and materials with intent to counterfeit drivers licenses is now a
felony.282 Flight or wilful refusal to stop by a motor vehicle operator
with knowledge that he has been directed to stop by a police officer is now
a misdemeanor.233 Breaking or inserting an instrument into a coin oper-
ated machine (vending machine, parking meter, etc.) is now a mis-
demeanor.234
230. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-558.
231. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-210, amends FLA. STAT. § 856.04 (1963).
232. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-278, creating FLA. STAT. § 831.29 (1965).
233. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-388, creating FLA. STAT. § 317.0109 (1965).
234. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 165.
